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Abstract. Intuitionistic Propositional Logic is proved to be an infinitely many
valued logic by Kurt Go¨del (1932), and it is proved by Stanis law Jas´kowski (1936)
to be a countably many valued logic. In this paper, we provide alternative proofs
for these theorems by using models of Saul Kripke (1959). Go¨del’s proof gave
rise to an intermediate propositional logic (between intuitionistic and classical),
that is known nowadays as Go¨del or the Go¨del-Dummet Logic, and is studied by
fuzzy logicians as well. We also provide some results on the inter-definability of
propositional connectives in this logic.
Keywords: Intuitionistic Propositional Logic · Many Valued Logics · Kripke
Models · Go¨del-Dummet Logic · Inter-Definability of Propositional Connectives.
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Intuitionism grew out of some of the philosophical ideas of its founding father, Luitzen
Egbertus Jan Brouwer (see e.g. [1]); what is known nowadays as intuitionistic logic is
a formalization given by his student Arend Heyting [4]. Kripke models (originating
from [6]) provided an interesting mathematical interpretation for this formalization.
Let us review some preliminaries about these models:
Definition 1 (Kripke Frames).
A Kripke frame is a partially ordered set; i.e., an ordered pair 〈K,<〉 where <⊆ K2
is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relation on K . ✧
Definition 2 (Atoms, Formulas, Languages).
Let At be the set of all the propositional atoms; atoms are usually denoted by leers p
or q. Let⊤ denote the verum (truth) constant.
e language of propositional logics studied here is L = {¬,∧,∨,→,⊤}.
⋆ Dedicated to Professor Mohammad Ardeshir with high appreciation and admiration.
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For any A ⊆ At and B ⊆ L , the set of all the formulas constructed from A by means
of B is denoted by L(B,A).
Let Fm denote the set of all the formulas; i.e., L(L , At). ✧
Definition 3 (Kripke Models).
A Kripke model is a triple K = 〈K,<,〉, where 〈K,<〉 is a Kripke frame equipped
with a persistent binary (satisfaction) relation⊆ K×At; persistency (of the relation
with respect to<) means that for all k, k′ ∈ K and p ∈ At, if k′<k  p then k′  p.
e satisfaction relation can be extended to all the (propositional) formulas, i.e., to
 ⊆ K × Fm, as follows:
◦ k  ⊤.
◦ k  (ϕ∧ψ) ⇐⇒ k  ϕ and k  ψ.
◦ k  (ϕ∨ψ) ⇐⇒ k  ϕ or k  ψ.
◦ k  (¬ϕ) ⇐⇒ ∀k′<k(k′ 1 ϕ).
◦ k  (ϕ→ψ) ⇐⇒ ∀k′<k(k′  ϕ⇒ k′  ψ). ✧
Remark 1 (On Persistency and its Converse).
It can be shown that the persistency conditions is inherited by the formulas; i.e., for
any k, k′ ∈ K in any Kripke modelK = 〈K,<,〉 and for any formulaϕ, if k′<k  ϕ
then k′  ϕ.
Obviously, the converse may not hold (k′  ψ and k′ < k do not necessarily imply
that k  ψ); however, a partial converse holds for negated formulas:
if k′<k and k′  ¬ϕ, then k 1 ϕ. ✧
By the soundness and completeness of the intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL)
with respect to finite Kripke models, the tautologies of IPL are the formulas (in Fm) that
are satisfied in all the elements of any finite Kripke model. A super-intuitionistic and
sub-classical logic is the so-called Go¨del-Dummet logic (see [2]), whose tautologies
are the formulas that are satisfied in all the elements of all the connected finite Kripke
models. A kind of Kripke model theoretic characterization for this logic is given in [8].
Definition 4 (Connectivity).
A binary relationR ⊆ K×K is called connected, when for any k, k′, k′′ ∈ K , if k′<k
and k′′<k, then we have either k′<k′′ or k′′<k′ (cf. [10]). ✧
e logic IPL is perhaps the most famous non-classical logic. A natural question
(that according to Kurt Go¨del [3] was asked by his supervisor Hans Hahn) was whether
IPL is a finitely many valued logic or not. Go¨del [3] showed in 1932 that IPL is not
finitely many valued. Stanis law Jas´kowski [5] showed in 1936 that IPL is indeed a
countably (infinite) many valued logic. In Section 2 we give alternative proofs for
these theorems by using Kripke models [6] which were invented later in 1959. Go¨del’s
proof gave birth to an intermediate logic, that today is called the Go¨del-Dummet logic
(GDL). Finally, in Section 3 we study the problem of inter-definability of propositional
connectives in GDL and IPL.
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2 ω−Many Values for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic
Let us begin with a formal definition of a many-valued logic. roughout the paper,
we are dealing with propositional logics only.
Definition 5 (Many Valued Logics).
A many valued logic is 〈V , τ ,∽,Λ,V,=>〉, where V is a set of values with a designated
element τ ∈ V (interpreted as the truth) and the functions ∽: V →V , Λ: V 2→V ,
V: V 2→V , and => : V 2→V constitute a truth table on V .
A valuation function is any mapping ν : At → V , which can be extended to all the
formulas, denoted also by ν : Fm→ V , as follows:
◦ ν(¬ϕ) = ∽ ν(ϕ).
◦ ν(ϕ∧ψ) = ν(ϕ) Λ ν(ψ).
◦ ν(ϕ∨ψ) = ν(ϕ) V ν(ψ).
◦ ν(ϕ→ψ) = ν(ϕ) => ν(ψ).
A formula θ is called tautology, when it is mapped to the designated value under any
valuation function; i.e., ν(θ) = τ for any valuation ν. ✧
eorem 1 appears in [7] and [9]. In the following, the disjunction operation (∨)
is assumed to be commutative and associative.
Lemma 1 (A Tautology in n-Valued Logics).
For any n > 1, the formula
∨
i<j6n(pi→ pj) is a tautology in any n-valued logic in
which the formula (p→p)∨q is a tautology.
Proof.
In an n-valued logic, the n + 1 atoms {p0, p1, · · · , pn} can take n values. So, under
a valuation function, there should exist some i < j 6 n such that pi and pj take
the same value, by the Pigeonhole Principle. Since (p → p)∨q is a tautology, then
the formula
∨
i<j6n(pi → pj) should be mapped to the designated value by all the
valuation functions. ❑
e lemma implies that the formula (A→B) ∨ (A→C)∨ (B→C) is a tautology
in the classical propositional logic; this formula is not a tautology in the intuitionistic
(or even Go¨del-Dummet) propositional logic.
eorem 1 (Go¨del 1932: IPL Is Not Finitely Many Valued).
Intuitionistic propositional logic is not finitely many valued.
Proof.
By Lemma 1 it suffices to show that for any n > 1, the formula
∨
i<j6n(pi→ pj) is
not a tautology in IPL. Consider the Kripke model K = 〈K,<,〉 with
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K = {k, k0, k1, · · · , kn−1},
<= {(ki, k) | i<n} ∪ {(ki, ki) | i<n} ∪ {(k, k)}, and
 = {(k0, p0), (k1, p1), · · · , (kn−1, pn−1)}.
• k0[[p0]] • k1[[p1]] · · · • kn−1[[pn−1]]
• k[[]]
✻
✲✛
For any i < n we have ki  pi, and also ki 1 pj for any j > i. So, ki 1 pi→ pj for
any i < j 6 n; which implies that k 1
∨
i<j6n(pi→pj). ❑
e rest of this section is devoted to proving Jas´kowski’s result (eorem 2) that
IPL is a countably infinite many valued logic.
Definition 6 (Monotone Functions).
For a Kripke frame (K,<), a function f : K → {0, 1} is called monotone, when for
any k, k′ ∈ K , if k′ < k, then f(k′) > f(k). We indicate the monotonicity of f by
writing f : (K,<)→ {0, 1}. ✧
Example 1 ( f
ψ
K
).
For any Kripke model K = (K,<,) and any formula ψ, the function
f
ψ
K
: K → {0, 1}, fψ
K
(k) =
{
1 if k  ψ
0 if k 1 ψ
is monotone. ✧
Definition 7 (∽,Λ,V and=>).
For a Kripke frame (K,<) and monotone functions f, g : (K,<)→ {0, 1}, let
∽f : K → {0, 1} be defined by (∽f)(k) =
{
1 if ∀k′<k(f(k′)=0)
0 if ∃k′<k(f(k′)=1)
,
f Λ g : K → {0, 1} be defined by (f Λ g)(k) = min{f(k), g(k)},
f V g : K → {0, 1} be defined by (f V g)(k) = max{f(k), g(k)},
f=>g : K → {0, 1} be defined by
(f=>g)(k) =
{
1 if ∀k′<k(f(k′)=1⇒g(k′)=1)
0 if ∃k′<k(f(k′)=1 & g(k′)=0)
,
for all k ∈ K . ✧
Definition 8 (Constant Functions).
Let 1K : K → {0, 1} be the constant 1 function, i.e., 1K(k) = 1 for all k ∈ K ; and let
0K : K → {0, 1} be the constant 0 function: 0K(k) = 0 for all k ∈ K . ✧
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It is easy to see that the functions 1K and 0K obey the rules of the classical
propositional logic with the operations ∽,Λ,V and =>. For example, (∽1K) = 0K ,
(1K Λ 1K) = 1K , (0K V 1K) = 1K and (1K => 0K) = 0K . We omit the proof of
the following straightforward observation.
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity of 1K ,0K ,∽f, f Λ g, f V g and f=>g).
For any Kripke frame (K,<), the constant functions 1K and 0K are monotone, and if
f, g : (K,<)→ {0, 1} are monotone, then so are ∽f, f Λ g, f V g and f=>g. ❑
Finally, we can provide the following countably many values for IPL:
Definition 9 (Countably Many Values for IPL).
Enumerate all the finite Kripke frames as (K0,<0), (K1,<1), (K2,<2), · · · , where
Kn ⊂ N for all n ∈ N. Let
V = {〈f0, f1, f2, · · · 〉 | ∀n[fn : (Kn,<n)→{0, 1}] &
∃N ∈N[(∀n>Nfn=1Kn) or (∀n>Nfn=0Kn)]}.
In the other words, the set of values V consists of all the sequences 〈f0, f1, f2, · · · 〉
such that for each n, fn is a monotone function on (Kn,<n), and the sequences are
ultimately constant (from a step onward, fn’s are either all 1Kn or all 0Kn ).
Let τ = 〈1K0 ,1K1 ,1K2 , · · · 〉 be the designated element (for truth).
For f = 〈f0, f1, f2, · · · 〉 ∈ V and g = 〈g0, g1, g2, · · · 〉 ∈ V , let (cf. Definition 7)
∽ f = 〈∽f0,∽f1,∽f2, · · · 〉,
fΛ g = 〈f0 Λ g0, f1Λ g1, f2Λ g2, · · · 〉,
fV g = 〈f0V g0, f1V g1, f2V g2, · · · 〉, and
f=>g = 〈f0=>g0, f1=>g1, f2=>g2, · · · 〉. ✧
It can be immediately seen that V is a countable set, and Lemma 2 implies that V
is closed under the operations ∽,Λ,V and =>. Before proving the main theorem, we
make a further definition and prove an auxiliary lemma.
Definition 10 (〈〈α〉〉n, 
ν
n and ν

m).
For a sequence α, let 〈〈α〉〉n denote its n-th element (if any), for any n ∈ N.
(1) Let a valuation ν : At→ V be given. e satisfaction relation νn is defined on any
finite Kripke frame (Kn,<n), with Kn ⊂ N (see Definition 9), by the following for
any atom p ∈ At and any k ∈ Kn: k 
ν
n p ⇐⇒ 〈〈ν(p)〉〉n(k) = 1.
(2) Let a Kripke model K = (Km,<m,) on the Kripke frame (Km,<m) be given
(see Definition 9). Define the valuation νm by
ν

m(p) = 〈1K0 , · · · ,1Km−1, f
p
K
,1Km+1 , · · · 〉
for any p ∈ At, where fp
K
: Km → {0, 1} is the function that was defined in Example 1:
f
p
K
(k) = 1 if k  p, and fp
K
(k) = 0 if k 1 p, for any k ∈ Km. ✧
It is clear that the relation νn ⊆ Kn × At is persistent.
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Lemma 3 (On νn and ν

m).
(1) Let a valuation ν : At → V be given, and the satisfaction relation νn be defined on
(Kn,<n) as in Definition 10. en for any formula ϕ ∈ Fm and any k ∈ Kn, we have
k νn ϕ ⇐⇒ 〈〈ν(ϕ)〉〉n(k) = 1.
(2) Let a Kripke model K = (Km,<m,) be given on the frame (Km,<m), and the
valuation νm be defined as in Definition 10. en for any formula ϕ ∈ Fm and any
k ∈ Km, we have k 1 ϕ ⇐⇒ 〈〈ν

m(ϕ)〉〉m(k) = 0.
Proof.
Both assertions can be proved by induction on ϕ. ey are clear for ϕ = ⊤ and hold
for atomic ϕ ∈ At by Definition 10. e inductive cases follow immediately from
Definitions 3, 5, 7, and 9. ❑
eorem 2 (Jas´kowski 1936: IPL Is Countably Many Valued).
Intuitionistic propositional logic is countably infinite many valued.
Proof.
We show that a formula ϕ ∈ Fm is satisfied in all the elements of all the finite Kripke
models if and only if it is mapped to the designated element under all the valuation
functions:
(1) If ϕ is satisfied in any element of any finite Kripke model, then for any valuation
ν by Lemma 3(1) we have 〈〈ν(ϕ)〉〉n = 1Kn for any n ∈ N, so ν(ϕ) = τ .
(2) If ϕ is not satisfied in some element of some finite Kripke model, then for some
m ∈ N there is a Kripke modelK = (Km,<m,) such that k 1 ϕ for some k ∈ Km.
So, by Lemma 3(2) we have 〈〈νm(ϕ)〉〉m(k) = 0, thus ν

m(ϕ) 6= τ . ❑
3 Propositional Connectives inside Go¨del-Dummet Logic
In classical propositional logic (which is a two valued logic), all the connectives can
be defined by (the so-called complete set of connectives) {¬,∧}, {¬,∨} or {¬,→}
only. In this last section we will see that no propositional connective is definable from
the others in IPL, and in GDL only the disjunction operation (∨) can be defined by
the conjunction (∧) and implication (→) operations. Most of these facts are already
known (they appear in e.g. [9] and [10]). eorem 3 is from [10] with a slightly different
proof; eorem 4 is from [10] with the same proof. All of our proofs are Kripke model
theoretic, as usual.
eorem 3 (∧ Is Not Definable From the Others in GDL).
In Go¨del-Dummet Logic, the conjunction connective (∧) is not definable from the other
propositional connectives.
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Proof.
Consider the Kripke model K = 〈K,<,〉 where K = {a, b, c}, < is the reflexive
closure of {(a, b), (c, b)}, and  = {(a, p), (b, p), (b, q), (c, q)}, for atoms p, q ∈ At.
• b[[p,q]]
• a[[p]]
✲
• c[[q]]
✛
We show that for all formulas θ ∈ L(¬,∨,→,⊤, p, q) we have:
(∗) b  θ =⇒ a  θ or c  θ.
is will prove the desired conclusion, since b  p∧q but a, c 1 p∧q, and so p∧q
cannot belong to L(¬,∨,→,⊤, p, q). We prove (∗) by induction on θ. e cases of
θ = ⊤, p, q are trivial, and the induction step of ¬ϕ follows from Remark 1, and the
case of ϕ ∨ ψ is rather easy. So, only the non-trivial case of θ = ϕ → ψ remains.
Suppose that (∗) holds for ϕ and ψ, and assume (for the sake of a contradiction) that
b  ϕ→ ψ but a, c 1 ϕ→ ψ. So, a  ϕ and a 1 ψ; and also c  ϕ and c 1 ψ.
Whence, by persistency, we should have also b  ϕ, thus b  ψ. So, by the induction
hypothesis (∗ for θ=ψ) we should have either a  ψ or c  ψ; a contradiction. ❑
eorem 4 (→ Is Not Definable From the Others in GDL).
In Go¨del-Dummet Logic, the implication connective (→) is not definable from the other
propositional connectives.
Proof.
For the Kripke model K = 〈K,<,〉, where K = {a, b, c}, < is the reflexive closure
of {(a, b), (c, b)}, and  = {(a, p), (b, p), (b, q)}, for p, q ∈ At,
• b[[p,q]]
• a[[p]]
✲
• c[[]]
✛
we show that for all the formulas θ ∈ L(¬,∨,∧,⊤, p, q), the following holds:
(∗) b, c  θ =⇒ a  θ.
is completes the proof since b, c  p→ q but a 1 p→ q (by a  p, a 1 q); thus
we have (p→q) 6∈ L(¬,∨,∧,⊤, p, q). e proof of (∗) is by induction on θ; the only
non-trivial cases to consider are θ = ϕ∨ψ and θ = ϕ∧ψ. Suppose that (∗) holds for ϕ
and ψ; and that b, c  ϕ∨ψ. en we have either c  ϕ or c  ψ; by the persistency,
the former implies b  ϕ and the laer b  ψ. So, in either case by the induction
hypothesis we have a  ϕ∨ψ. e case of θ = ϕ∧ψ is even simpler. ❑
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e following has been known for a long time; see e.g. [2].
eorem 5 (∨ Is Definable From ∧,→ in GDL).
In Go¨del-Dummet Logic, the disjunction connective (∨) is definable from some other
propositional connectives.
Proof.
It is rather easy to see that IPL  (p∨q) −→ [(p→ q)→ q]∧ [(q→ p)→ p]. Now,
we show that GDL  [(p → q) → q]∧ [(q → p) → p] −→ (p∨q) holds. Take an
arbitrary connected Kripke model K = 〈K,<,〉, and suppose that for an arbitrary
a ∈ K we have a  [(p→ q)→ q]∧[(q→ p)→ p]. We show that a  p∨q. Assume
not; then a 1 p,q. erefore, a 1 (p→q) and a 1 (q→p), by a  [(p→q)→q] and
a  [(q→p)→p], respectively. So, there should exist some b, c ∈ K with b, c<a such
that b  p, b 1 q, c  q, and c 1 p.
• b[[p]] • c[[q]]
• a[[]]
✲
✛
By the connectivity of <, we should have either b < c or c< b. Both cases lead to a
contradiction, by the persistency condition. So, the following equivalence
(p∨q) ≡ [(p→q)→q]∧[(q→p)→p]
holds in GDL. ❑
e fact of the maer is that (p∨q) ≡ [(p→ q)→ q]∧[(q→ p)→ p] is the only
non-trivial equivalence relation between the propositional connectives in GDL. e
first half of the following theorem was proved in [9].
eorem 6 (In GDL ∨ Is Not Definable Without Both ∧,→).
In Go¨del-Dummet Logic, the disjunction connective (∨) is not definable from the other
propositional connectives, unless both the conjunction and the implication connectives are
present. In the other words, ∨ is definable neither from the set {¬,→,⊤} nor from the
set {¬,∧,⊤}.
Proof.
Take the Kripke modelK = 〈K,<,〉withK = {a, b, c, d},<= the reflexive closure
of {(a, b), (c, d)}, and  = {(b, p), (d, q)}, for p, q ∈ At.
• b[[p]] • d[[q]]
• a[[]]
✻
• c[[]]
✻
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We show that for all θ ∈ L(¬,→,⊤, p, q) we have
(∗) b, d  θ =⇒ a  θ or c  θ.
Since b, d  p∨q but a, c 1 p∨q, then it follows that p∨q 6∈ L(¬,→,⊤, p, q).
Now, (∗) can be proved by induction on θ; the only non-trivial case is θ = ϕ→ψ. If
(∗) holds for ϕ and ψ, then if b, d  ϕ→ψ but a 1 ϕ→ψ and c 1 ϕ→ψ, then we
should have a  ϕ and a 1 ψ, and also c  ϕ and c 1 ψ. So, by persistency, b  ϕ
and d  ϕ; thus b  ψ and d  ψ. So, by the induction hypothesis (∗ for θ=ψ) we
should have either a  ψ or c  ψ; a contradiction.
Now, for proving p∨ q 6∈ L(¬,∧,⊤, p, q), we show that for all the formulas θ in
L(¬,∧,⊤, p, q) we have
(‡) b, d  θ =⇒ a, c  θ.
Trivially, (‡) holds for θ = ⊤, p, q; so by Remark 1 it only suffices to show that (‡)
holds for θ = ϕ∧ψ, when it holds for ϕ and ψ. Now, if b, d  ϕ∧ψ then b, d  ϕ
and b, d  ψ; so the induction hypothesis (‡ for θ= ϕ, ψ) implies that a, c  ϕ and
a, c  ψ, therefore a, c  ϕ∧ψ. ❑
We end the paper with a Kripke model theoretic proof of a known fact.
Proposition 1 (No Connective Is Definable From the Others in IPL).
In IPL, no propositional connective is definable from the others.
Proof.
By eorems 3 and 4, ∧ and → are not definable from the other connectives even in
GDL. e statement ¬p 6∈ L(∧,∨,→,⊤, p) can be easily verified by noting that all
the operations on the righthand side are positive. So, all it remains is to show that we
have p∨q 6∈ L(¬,∧,→,⊤, p, q) in IPL (cf. eorem 5). Consider the Kripke model
K = 〈K,<,〉 with K = {a, b, c}, <= the reflexive closure of {(a, b), (a, c)}, and
 = {(b, p), (c, q)}, for p, q ∈ At.
• b[[p]] • c[[q]]
• a[[]]
✲
✛
We show that for all formulas θ ∈ L(¬,∧,→,⊤, p, q) we have:
(∗) b, c  θ =⇒ a  θ.
is will prove the theorem, since b, c  p∨q but a 1 p∨q, and so p∨q is not in
L(¬,∧,→,⊤, p, q) in IPL. Indeed, (∗) can be proved by induction on θ; for which we
consider the case of θ = ϕ→ ψ only. So, suppose that (∗) holds for ϕ and ψ and
that b, c  ϕ→ ψ but a 1 ϕ→ ψ. en we should have a  ϕ and a 1 ψ; but by
persistency we should have that b, c  ϕ, and so b, c  ψ holds. Now, the induction
hypothesis (∗ for θ=ψ) implies that a  ψ, a contradiction. ❑
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